TY - GEN
T1 - Denial of service attacks and defenses in decentralized trust management
AU - Li, Jiangtao
AU - Li, Ninghui
AU - Wang, Xiao Feng
AU - Yu, Ting
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - Trust management is an approach to scalable and flexible access control in decentralized systems. In trust management, a server often needs to evaluate a chain of credentials submitted by a client; this requires the server to perform multiple expensive digital signature verifications. In this paper, we study low-bandwidth Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks that exploit the existence of trust management systems to deplete server resources. Although the threat of DoS attacks has been studied for some application-level protocols such as authentication protocols, we show that it is especially destructive for trust management systems. Exploiting the delegation feature in trust management languages, an attacker can forge a long credential chain to force a server to consume a large amount of computing resource. Using game theory as an analytic tool, we demonstrate that unprotected trust management servers will easily fall prey to a witty attacker who moves smartly. We report our empirical study of existing trust management systems, which manifests the gravity of this threat. We also propose a defense technique using credential caching, and show that it is effective in the presence of intelligent attackers.
AB - Trust management is an approach to scalable and flexible access control in decentralized systems. In trust management, a server often needs to evaluate a chain of credentials submitted by a client; this requires the server to perform multiple expensive digital signature verifications. In this paper, we study low-bandwidth Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks that exploit the existence of trust management systems to deplete server resources. Although the threat of DoS attacks has been studied for some application-level protocols such as authentication protocols, we show that it is especially destructive for trust management systems. Exploiting the delegation feature in trust management languages, an attacker can forge a long credential chain to force a server to consume a large amount of computing resource. Using game theory as an analytic tool, we demonstrate that unprotected trust management servers will easily fall prey to a witty attacker who moves smartly. We report our empirical study of existing trust management systems, which manifests the gravity of this threat. We also propose a defense technique using credential caching, and show that it is effective in the presence of intelligent attackers.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=50049121996&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359545
DO - 10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359545
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:50049121996
SN - 1424404231
SN - 9781424404230
T3 - 2006 Securecomm and Workshops
BT - 2006 Securecomm and Workshops
T2 - 2006 Securecomm and Workshops
Y2 - 28 August 2006 through 1 September 2006
ER -