Informal and Political Agreements as Sources of Obligation? Sketching a Theory of International Political Normativity

This Article argues that a particular trend is emerging whereby states and intergovernmental organisations are relying less on treaties and contracts in certain fields of regulation in favour of more flexible types of agreements. These agreements, although predicated on language suggesting non-binding (or soft law) obligations, are of a sui geners nature, which this article suggests give rise to international political normativity. That is, while its protagonists maintain that they are not bound by the terms of their pledges and undertakings, in fact the practice of participating states demonstrates a desire to set up elaborate mechanisms that encompass complex webs of commitment to and with other stakeholders. Participation in these complex mechanisms portrays a normative character that cannot be explained by reference to treaties and contracts, nor by reference to non-binding, soft law, agreements. This type of normativity is distinct from the similar term coined by political scientists, albeit many of its connotations strike a familiar chord.