The contractualization of fiscal and parliamentary sovereignty: Towards a private international finance architecture?

Ilias Bantekas*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

A state should be deemed to be enjoying fiscal sovereignty where it is effectively empowered, without pressure or coercion, to make all policy decisions required to run the state machinery and satisfy the fundamental needs of its people (at the very least), both individual and collective. A state's effective policy and decision-making power is effectively curtailed where: (1) it has been substituted in these functions by a third state or an organ of that state; (2) it is prevented from taking a particular action, such as unilateral default; (3) it is forced to violate fundamental domestic laws, including its constitution or the result of a referendum; or (4) external pressure is exerted against its government and institutions, with the aim of creating volatility and uncertainty concerning its finances so it succumbs to such pressure.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)139-159
Number of pages21
JournalGlobal Constitutionalism
Volume11
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 21 Mar 2022

Keywords

  • International Monetary Fund (IMF)
  • memoranda of understanding
  • parliament
  • self-determination
  • sovereign debt
  • sovereignty

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